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Conclusion: Shaky Foundations and
Slippery Slopes
Richard M.. Doerflinger*
The articles contained in this volume raise a broad array of
concerns about physician-assisted suicide and particularly about
the conceptualization of the practice as a constitutional right.
The parameters of the debate over physician-assisted suicide can
only be outlined in this brief concluding article.
I. BREAKING WITH HISTORY AND TRADITION
A time-honored method for determining whether a particular
practice merits constitutional protection is to inquire whether
the practice is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."' Relying on a biased selection of historical facts and inter-
pretations, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United
States has sought to find a basis for a right to hasten death
through assisted suicide. 2 A mark of the Ninth Circuit's failure
is the fact that the Second Circuit, though seeking the same
result, abandoned a historical search as futile.3
The fact that suicide and euthanasia have been rejected by the
Jewish and Christian tradition, for many centuries, and* that
these traditions find independent confirmation in the Hippo-
cratic Oath, which has formed the very idea of the medical pro-
fession, is difficult to deny or downplay. Likewise, it is also
difficult to deny or downplay the fact that the English common
law and American legal traditions have consistently treated
assistance in a suicide as a grave crime.4
* Associate Director for Policy Development at the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activ-
ities, National Conference of Catholic Bishops; (M.A. in Divinity, The University of
Chicago.)
1. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (plurality opinion).
2. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 806-10 (9th Cir. 1996) en
banc, cert. granted, Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No.
96-110).
3. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 65
U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
4. See C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996); See also John
Dolan, Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Possible?, 35 DUQ. L. Rlv. 355 (1996); Daniel Avila,
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These traditions continue into the present day not only
through stands taken against assisted suicide by most major reli-
gious groups,5 but also by specific prohibition against assisted
suicide in thirty-five states, two of them, in Iowa and Rhode
Island, enacted this year, and by prohibition resulting from
interpretation of the common law or homicide statutes in most
other states. While proponents of assisted suicide can cite the
passage of one legalization measure in Oregon in 1994 in support
of the practice, opponents of assisted suicide can clearly cite the
defeat of similar assisted suicide proposals in many other states;
and particularly such defeats occurring in fifteen states since the
Oregon vote.6 To say the least, therefore, history cannot plausi-
bly mandate or support the legalization of the assisted suicide
practice.
II. INHERENT IN ORDERED LIBERTY?
It is possible that in support of assisted suicide, individuals
can takea more open-ended or "progressive" view of the Consti-
tution and claim a deeper insight into its historical implications
than have more cautious ages. If the freedom to choose assisted
suicide is not firmly grounded in the history and tradition of the
United States, then perhaps upon a more profound reflection this
freedom is among the liberties that are so "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty" that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed."
7
Notably, further reflection on this theory raises conundrums.
An individual's freedom to choose assisted suicide is a strange
new kind of human freedom: a freedom to extinguish life and all
possibility of future freedom. If the right to live can be called the
most basic right, a "right to have rights,"' the right of a suicidal
individual to assistance in taking his or her life seems a most
irreversible alienation of a supposedly inalienable right. Like
the freedom to sell oneself into slavery, which has been a "lib-
erty" barred for over a century by the Thirteenth Amendment,
the freedom to have oneself killed may more properly be viewed
Is the Constitution a Suicide Pact?, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 201 (1996); Leon R. Kass & Nelson
Lund, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Medical Ethics, and the Future of the Medical Profes-
sion, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 395 (1996).
5. See Richard Coleson, Contemporary Religious Viewpoints 35 DuQ. L. REv. 43
(1996).
6. Life at Risk, A Chronicle of Euthanasia Trends in America (National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, Washington, D.C.), July/August 1996.
7. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (cited in Quill, 80 F.3d at
723).
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289-90 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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as a self-contradiction of freedom rather than its ultimate
pinnacle. 9
Many Americans, however, including some jurists find such
philosophical concerns all too abstract. The key policy issue in
supporting assisted suicide is the purported benefit arising from
the practice to suffering individuals. What is the cost/benefit
calculus for a policy of legalization? Can society help to end the
suffering of a few desperately ill patients without harming many
others in the process?
It is at this point that the set of issues usually referred to as
the "slippery slope" needs to be addressed. Such issues arise at
two levels. On the first level, the practice of assisted suicide may
place members of society on a conceptual slippery slope, so that it
will be logically difficult or impossible to raise principled objec-
tions to further expansions of the idea once the basic premise is
accepted. On the second level, a more empirical level, such a
practice may in fact combine with various other contingent fac-
tors in society to produce massive abuse, so that this practice
here and now is inadvisable. This phenomenon is perhaps better
described as the "loose cannon" effect.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL SLIPPERY SLOPE
A policy seeking to allow physician-assisted suicide only at the
voluntary request of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult
has some problems of internal coherence; problems greatly mag-
nified by any attempt to define such a right in constitutional
terms. Even a seemingly simple term such as "terminal illness"
becomes hopelessly complex upon closer examination. Indeed,
even the Supreme Court has noted that "it is often impossible to
identify a patient as terminally ill except in retrospect." 10 Medi-
cal experts have found that the term "terminally ill" is not only
difficult to apply, but almost impossible to define." Predictions
based on a precise definition of this term, such as, a definition
that includes only individuals estimated to have less than a 50%
chance of living for six months, will still often be wrong. The
arbitrariness of the definition will also raise concerns about its
relevance and prompt new "equal protection" claims by patients
who fall just outside the definition's borders. Alternatively, the
precision of the definition may be abandoned, as illustrated by
9. See John Dolan, Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Possible?, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 355
(1996).
10. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556 (1979).
11. See Joanne Lynn et al., Defining the "Terminally Ill:k " Insights from SUPPORT,
35 DuQ. L. REv. 311 (1996); See also Eric Chevlen, The Limits Of Prognostication, 35
DUQ. L. REv. 337 (1996).
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the Ninth Circuit's expansive acceptance of all of the definitions
of "terminal illness" found in more than forty state laws.' In
that case, however, many patients with chronic or debilitating
conditions that are not "terminal" in any ordinary sense of the
term will be deemed eligible for assisted suicide. Thus, either
option outlined above with respect to defining the term "termi-
nally ill" creates its own slippery slope.
Similar difficulties arise in determining the nature and scope
of a terminally ill patient's "competent" and "voluntary" request
for death. The application of either term to the request is prob-
lematic if suicidal individuals with terminal illness, like suicidal
individuals generally and unlike individuals who refuse
extraordinary life support, are almost always suffering from
potentially treatable depression.1 3 If an individual's terminal ill-
ness itself does not necessarily make the individual's suicidal
wish more common or "rational," what is the basis for treating
such a wish so differently from the wishes of patients who are not
terminally ill? Could the basis for this treatment really be an
independent judgment made by the state, rather than the indi-
vidual, that terminally ill individuals are objectively "better off
dead"? If so, why restrict the right to physician-assisted suicide
solely to cases in which the patient has been able and willing to
express his or her own "voluntary" wish?
The Ninth and Second Circuit decisions provide a tentative
answer to this question: Once physician-assisted suicide is estab-
lished as a constitutional right, courts will find a way for the
practice to be exercised by others on behalf of incompetent
patients as well. This is explicit in the Ninth Circuit's insistence
that friends, relatives or even state-appointed guardians may
make decisions for such patients so that "a decision of a duly
appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the
decision of the patient himself." 14 The same result is implicit,
but equally inevitable, in the Second Circuit's finding that there
is no rational distinction between assisted suicide and the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment. 15 Since the latter is rou-
tinely delegated to surrogate decisionmakers in the great
12. After noting, for example, that the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
and many state laws define a "terminal" condition "without reference to a fixed time
period," the court concludes that "all of the persons described in the various statutes
would appear to fall within an appropriate definition of the term." Compassion in Dying,
79 F.3d at 831 (emphasis added).
13. See Herbert Hendin, Suicide and the Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaning
and Motivation, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 225 (1996).
14. Id. note 120 at 832.
15. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d at 728.
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majority of states when a patient is incompetent, there would be
no rational basis for denying similar delegated decisionmaking
for assisted suicide.
The residual distinction between assisted suicide and the
direct killing of a patient by the administration of lethal drugs is
scarcely credible once the far clearer distinction between refus-
ing extraordinary life support and demanding lethal drugs is
abandoned. The Ninth Circuit found it "difficult to make a prin-
cipled distinction" between the two, particularly in the case of
patients who "may be unable to self-administer the drugs."16
Advocates of assisted suicide have gone further, arguing that
failure to authorize lethal injections "unfairly discriminates
against patients with unrelievable suffering who resolve to end
their lives but are physically unable to do so."17 Other advocates
point out how unreliable a suicide by orally ingested drugs may
be, insisting that the right to assisted death will not be ensured
unless "in every instance a doctor is standing by to administer
the coup de grace if necessary."' 8
Finally, the role of physicians in assisted suicide has far
broader implications than some individuals may realize. Such a
practice does not simply add one further tool to the physician's
traditional black bag. Rather, assisted suicide threatens to
transform the medical profession into a technical specialty
equally trained to use its skills for healing or for killing. 9 This
transformation seems well underway in the Netherlands, where
physicians accustomed to the practice of euthanasia have devel-
oped their own idea of what kind of life merits assisted death. In
many cases, these physicians have acted on that idea without
bothering to consult the patient.20 The move from healing to (ini-
tially compassionate) killing is so fundamental that by compari-
son, all other steps down the slope, from the terminally to the
chronically ill, from voluntary request to well-meaning substi-
tuted judgment, and from supplying to administering lethal
drugs, seem relatively unimportant and easily traversed.
16. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831.
17. Franklin Miller et al., Regulating Physician.Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. J.
OF MED. 120 (July 14, 1994).
18. Derek Humphry, Letter to the Editors, Oregon's Assisted Suicide Law Gives No
Sure Comfort to Dying, N.Y. Tmns, Dec. 3, 1994, at 22; M. O'Keefe, Dutch Researcher
Warns of Lingering Deaths, THE OazaNiAN, Dec. 4, 1994, at Al.
19. See C. Everett Koop, Introduction, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1996); See also John
Dolan, Is Physician-Assisted Suicide Possible? 35 DuQ. L. REv. 355 (1996).
20. See Herbert Hendin, The Slippery Slope: The Dutch Example, 35 DuQ. L. REV.
427 (1996); See also HERBERT HENDiN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: DocToRs, PATIENTS AND THE
DUTCH CURE (1996).
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To put this concern in its most chilling terms, one may recall
initial reports in the 1930's on Nazi plans "to kill incurables to
end pain."21 Described as "the act of providing a painless and
peaceful death," euthanasia was ostensibly to be granted only
when the patient "expressly and earnestly" requested it, or "in
case the patient no longer is able to express his desire, his nearer
relatives, acting from motives that do not contravene morals, so
request."22 Whatever monstrous dimensions the Nazi plans ulti-
mately assumed, it has been suggested that the portentous and
decisive step was taken when doctors were first authorized to
take innocent human life.23
The present killing of incompetent patients and newborn chil-
dren with disabilities in the Netherlands illustrates that omi-
nous expansions of euthanasia and assisted suicide do not occur
solely in racist and totalitarian regimes. Such expansion may be
an invariant feature of an agenda that has a logic of its own.
IV. EUTHANASIA IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYsTEM: LOOSE
CANNON ON A FOUNDERING SHIP?
To those individuals aware of Dutch euthanasia abuses, per-
haps the most damning comment on American plans for legaliz-
ing assisted suicide is that Dutch euthanasia practitioners reject
such an experiment on American soil as too dangerous. Notably,
as one such Dutch practitioner said to an American visitor, "I
wouldn't trust myself as a patient if your medical profession,
with their commercial outlook, should have that power."
24
While such criticism seems paradoxical in light of the evidence
of nonvoluntary killing in the Netherlands, it underscores a final
ambiguity and danger in the efforts to allow a "free choice" for
assisted suicide: choices may only be superficially free, because,
while sincerely expressed by the patient, the patient is heavily
influenced and even coerced by the forces in his or her environ-
ment. Whatever else it may be, the freedom to provide certain
persons with lethal drugs for suicide presents an extremely con-
venient means for solving many other people's problems.25
21. Associated Press, Nazis Plan to Kill Incurables to End Pain; German Religious
Groups Oppose Move, N.Y. TmiEs, Oct. 8, 1933, at 1 (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. One commentator notes: "At the heart of the Nazi enterprise... is the destruc-
tion of the boundary between healing and killing." ROBERT JAY LirrON, TiE NAZI Doc-
Toas 14 (1986).
24. J. Keown, Dutch Slide Down Euthanasia's Slippery Slope, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5,
1991, at A18.
25. On efforts to evade that fact and even to evade the reality of killing involved in
the practice, see Rita Marker & Wesley Smith, The Art of Verbal Engineering 35 DuQ. L.
REv. 81 (1996).
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Economic pressures in a financially pressed health care sys-
tem present the most obvious example of these dangers. These
pressures are amply illustrated by Oregon's Medicaid rationing
scheme, which denies some life-sustaining treatments to indi-
gent terminally ill citizens because they are not deemed cost-
effective, but reimburses the cost of providing assisted suicide in
all cases.26
More subtle but equally powerful pressures can be expected
from social prejudices against individuals who are old, disabled
and unproductive in a society oriented toward youth, vigor and
visible achievement. It would be naive in the extreme to imagine
that consent to assisted suicide on the part of debilitated and vul-
nerable patients would not be manipulated by others, as such
patients internalize the feelings of those around them that they
are a burden on family and community. The very act of estab-
lishing assisted suicide as a new "right" for these patients may
invite the judgment that those in poor health who fail to choose
the assisted suicide option are acting arbitrarily and even
selfishly.
These pressures and prejudices are not figments of the imagi-
nations of individuals who oppose assisted suicide in principle;
they are the bases upon which open-minded study groups have
concluded that legalized assisted suicide is a risky and unwise
gamble with helpless and marginalized individuals' lives. For
example, the twenty-five members of Governor Mario Cuomo's
Task Force on Life and the Law disagreed on the abstract ethics
of assisted suicide, but unanimously agreed to oppose legaliza-
tion of the practice:
The Task Force members concluded that the potential dangers of this
dramatic change in public policy would outweigh any benefit that
might be achieved. The risk of harm is greatest for the many individ-
uals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already com-
promised by poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced
age, or membership in a stigmatized social group. The risks of legal-
izing assisted suicide and euthanasia for these individuals, in a
health care system and society that cannot effectively protect against
the impact of inadequate resources and ingrained social disadvan-
tages, would be extraordinary.
28
26. See D. Postrel, State could cover assisted suicide, SALEM STATESMAN JOURNAL,
Dec. 6, 1994, at Al.
27. See Marshall Kapp, Old Folks On The Slippery Slope: Elderly Patients and
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 443 (1996); See also Herbert Hendin, Suicide
and the Request for Assisted Suicide: Meaning and Motivation, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 285
(1996).
28. THE NEw YoRm STATE TAsK FOaCE ON LF AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH is
SoUGHT: ASSISTED SuicmE AND EuTrANAsiA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, 120 (1994).
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The conclusion independently reached by the American Bar
Association's Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly is
strikingly similar:
Proposals in favor of personal autonomy and voluntary choice are
framed and limited by the options available to people. To argue that
the principle of personal autonomy includes euthanasia in a country
such as the United States which does not recognize a universal legal
right to access to quality care is near-sighted at best. At worst, it is a
serious danger to those without adequate care options, for they may
be subtly or not so subtly encouraged to "opt out" of life via aid in
dying precisely because they lack decent care alternatives or because
they may become serious financial burdens on their families.
29
These concerns were brushed aside by Judge Reinhardt of the
Ninth Circuit with the comment that providing universal access
to health care is a legislative task from which the federal judici-
ary is "compelled to stand aside."30 Surely, however, the judici-
ary is not required to ignore the social pressures and inequities
which will drive the implementation of its own call for access to
assisted suicide. Proclamation of a "free choice" for death, when
no other choice is accessible, is no victory for freedom. Further-
more, if euthanasia is defined by the courts as a valid aspect of
health care, it may be too late for new legislative health care ini-
tiatives designed to alleviate the social pressures toward eutha-
nasia, for such court rulings would be used to exert pressure
toward including euthanasia among the health care options
newly promoted to the marginalized.
V. STEPPING BACK: WHAT WAS THE QUESTION?
Anyone who spends time exploring the depths and dangers of
the euthanasia agenda may begin to wonder: If assisted suicide
was supposed to be the answer, what was the question?
There is evidence that the question posed by elderly and seri-
ously ill individuals is something quite different from, "how do I
more easily get assistance in suicide?" A recent study notes that
cancer patients experiencing significant pain are less likely than
the general public (or their own physicians) to favor assisted sui-
cide; what these patients really want is better relief for their
pain.31 Some disability rights leaders have become quite vocal in
their opposition to an agenda that they view as reinforcing
prejudices against the worth of a life with a permanent disabil-
29. American Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly, Mem-
orandum of Jan. 17, 1992, reprinted in 8 IssuEs iN L. & MED. 117, 121 (1992).
30. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 826.
31. E. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: attitudes and
experiences of oncology patients, oncologists, and the public, 347 THz LANCET 1805 (1996).
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ity.3 2 On a larger scale, numerous polls show strong opposition to
legalizing assisted suicide among senior citizens, and dispropor-
tionately strong support for the practice among young, white,
affluent males. 3 Is assisted suicide the answer sought by its
supposed beneficiaries, or just the solution that the able-bodied
have assumed would be best for all concerned?
Appeals for less dangerous alternative solutions, such as
improved pain control and care for dying patients, better access
to supportive services, and so on, are likely to be greeted with the
response that such care is currently inadequate. This, however,
seems to argue for a renewed commitment to solve these inade-
quacies. Medical experts, including those represented in this vol-
ume, universally agree that there is an enormous gap between
the "state of the art" in modern pain control and the actual prac-
tice of most physicians and hospitals in the United States. These
inadequacies of care help to drive the demand for assisted sui-
cide. It may be equally true that a leap to the "quick fix" of
assisted suicide will short-circuit any true commitment to make
this care as good and humane as it can be. The most basic prem-
ise behind any effort to improve the conditions of life for any class
of individuals is the firm conviction that individuals' lives really
matter. Twist, turn and evade it as one might, this basic premise
is thrown into question when a particular class of individuals is
proposed as offering good candidates for "assistance" in suicide.
34
When a car is not running well, no individual in his or her
right mind drops the car off at the junkyard without making sure
that it does not simply need an oil change or a full tank of gas.
The real problems of seriously ill patients in our society, to say
the least, deserve as much responsible attention. Clearly, this is
especially so if the alternative is a long drive down a slope that
increasingly resembles a vertical drop.
32. See IC Wolfe, Disabled Activists Fight Assisted Suicide, THE PRoGREssIvE 16
(Sept. 1996); H. Gallagher, Slapping Up Spastics: The Persistence of Social Attitudes
Toward People with Disabilities, 10 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 401 (1995).
33. See Life at Risk: A Chronicle of Euthanasia Trends in America, Oct. 1994, at 3-
4; See also id., June/July 1995, at 1; Id., June 1996, at 3. The Hemlock Society's own
polling indicates that "the younger the person, the more likely he or she is to favor this
legislation" allowing assisted suicide. Hemlock's newsletter notes that "this is somewhat
at odds with how Hemlock views its membership." See Poll Shows More Would Support
Law Using Gentler Language, TnvmlamEs 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1994).
34. On the differences between genuine compassion and the view that a life of suf-
fering lacks human dignity, see Courtney Campbell, Suffering, Compassion, and Dignity
in Dying, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 109 (1996).

